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Honour in UK Copyright Law is Not ‘A Trim Reckoning’ – its Impact on the Integrity Right and 
the Destruction of Works of Art  
Tania Cheng-Davies* 
Abstract - The meaning of ‘honour’ in section 80 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 is 
not easily ascertained. There has been a tendency for academics and judges to either equate the 
concept of ‘honour’ with that of ‘reputation’, or to ignore its presence altogether. The author will 
propose that there is little to justify such treatment of this concept. This article offers a re-
interpretation of the concept by analysis of anthropological theories of honour and of the Roman law 
of iniuria. By applying such re-interpretation, it is argued the concept of honour would play a far 
more significant role in articulating the integrity right under section 80 than previously envisaged. In 
particular, by interpreting ‘honour’ as a right to respect, it opens up the possibilities of recognising the 
artist’s right to object to the destruction of his works, a right which is presently unrecognised in UK 
copyright law.    
Keywords – copyright, moral rights, art, honour, anthropology, iniuria 
‘What is honour? A word. What is in that word honour? What is that honour?  Air.  A trim 
reckoning!’ 
William Shakespeare, Henry The Fourth Part I (V, ii, 132) 
1. Introduction 
Falstaff in Henry the Fourth Part I views honour as a mere word, ‘air’, ‘a trim reckoning’, a trifling 
with no concrete or substantial meaning. The character dismisses ‘honour’ and its abstract notions 
(‘Doth he feel it? No. Doth he hear it? No.’) as having no use whatsoever in real life.  Falstaff’s 
speech on ‘honour’ is revelatory of at least one aspect of the concept of honour – its elusiveness. 
Nowhere does the meaning of honour elude us more than the reference made to it in section 80 of the 
UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA).  
Sections 77 to 89 of the CDPA enshrine the English version of the moral rights doctrine, 
which governs the relationship between an author and his work. The scope of the doctrine varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with the UK only recognising four rights,1 one of which is the integrity 
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2 
 
right framed in sections 80 to 83, which is the right of an author to object to a mistreatment of his 
creation, providing such mistreatment is derogatory and prejudicial to his honour or reputation. The 
present wording of section 80 which mentions ‘honour’, is owed to the UK’s implementation of 
Article 6bis (1) of the Berne Convention, which reads as follows, 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, 
the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, 
which would be prejudicial to his honour (author’s emphasis) or reputation.  
The reference to honour in Article 6bis has been viewed as an unnecessary appendage in the 
common law, leading to at least one common law jurisdiction precluding any reference to honour 
altogether in its moral rights legislation.2 The omission of ‘honour’ from the WIPO Performance and 
Phonograms Treaty too has led one common law academic to observe that the concept was obsolete.3 
According to Adeney, ‘honour’ is commonly regarded as adding nothing to the concept of 
‘reputation’ and the term “remains unused and undefined in the United Kingdom.”4 
The concept of honour is relatively unknown in the common law, except for recent interest in 
cases involving honour killings, in discussions on the concept of reputation as used in the law of 
defamation,5 and its inclusion in section 80 CDPA. However, despite its inclusion in section 80, it has 
curiously been in the main, overlooked by law academics, save for a handful of articles, mostly 
penned by antipodean academics in their analysis of amendments to the Australian Copyright Act,6 
                                                                 
2 Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (Ireland), s 109 (1). 
3 Patricia Loughlan, ‘The Right of Integrity: What is in that Word Honour? What is in that Word Reputation?’ 
(2001) 12 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 189. Loughlan also refers to Falstaff’s speech on “honour”. 
4 Elizabeth Adeney, ‘The moral right of integrity: the past and future of "honour"’ (2005) 2 Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 111. 
5 Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation  (OUP Oxford 2007), 42-56; Robert C Post, ‘The Social 
Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution’ 74 California Law Review 691. 
6 Loughlan (n 3); Dean Ellionson and Eliezer Symonds, ‘Australian Legislative Protection of Copyright  
Authors' Honour’ (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 623; Elizabeth Adeney, ‘Defining the shape of 
Australia's moral rights: a review of the new laws’ (Intellectual Property Quarterly) (2001) 4 291; Elizabeth 
Adeney, ‘Authors' rights in works of public sculpture: a German/Australian comparison’ (2003) 33 International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 164; Dennis Lim, ‘Prejudice to Honour or Reputation in 
Copyright Law’ (2007) 33 Monash University Law Review. See also Adeney, ‘The moral right of integrity: the 
past and future of "honour"’ (n 4) for a detailed analysis of French and German legal sources regarding the 
concept of ‘honour’.  
3 
 
and discussions in UK practitioner and specialist texts.7  Much of what has been written about honour 
however appears to focus on the role it plays in imbuing the moral rights provisions with subjectivity, 
rather than engaging in an in-depth study of its meaning and in what circumstances it would be 
prejudiced, in contrast to circumstances where reputation is being prejudiced. Furthermore, as will be 
discussed later, judges in the few UK cases on the integrity right appear to treat “honour” as 
synonymous with “reputation”, generally neglecting to give full consideration to the concept of 
“honour” itself.8   
More in-depth scholarship on the concept of “honour” is therefore useful and important given 
the apparent judicial reluctance to engage with the concept fully, and especially since it holds a key 
position both within Article 6bis and Section 80. It is clear, as will be explained later, that the 
legislators of Article 6bis envisaged interests extending beyond merely reputation, and any further 
light which can be thrown upon the concept of “honour” is long overdue. It is the aim of this article to 
cast this much needed light. It is peculiar that such a specific criterion prescribed in the legislation has 
been given such scant attention and application. This article thus aims to shed further light on the 
meaning of honour as it is positioned within section 80, not only from a doctrinal analysis of relevant 
legislation and case law, but also from the perspectives of Roman Law, in particular its formulation of 
iniuria, and of anthropological studies on honour.  It is hoped that this article will contribute fresh 
insights into the concept of honour which will help to clarify the boundaries of the integrity right, in 
particular, the question of whether destruction of a work amounts to a breach of the integrity right. At 
present, the conventional view is that as destruction leaves nothing of the original work behind, there 
can be nothing left that can affect the author’s reputation, unlike a work which has been maltreated or 
deformed in some way, which does leave behind a misrepresentation of the author’s work.9 However, 
                                                                 
7 Jonathan Griffiths, ‘Not such a 'Timid Thing': the UK's Integrity Right and Freedom of Expression’ in 
Jonathan Griffiths and Uma Suthersanen (eds), Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International 
Analyses (OUP Oxford 2005) paras 9.40-9.50; Elizabeth Adeney, The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers: 
An International and Comparative Analysis (OUP 2006) paras 14.69-14.75; Gillian Davies and Kevin Garnett, 
Moral Rights (1st edn, Thomson Reuters (Legal) Limited 2010) paras 8-036 - 8-040. 
8 Griffiths (n 7) para 9.43. 
9 Destruction is not specifically provided for under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. However, a Resolution 
was passed at the Brussels Revision Conference which encouraged countries to adopt moral rights which could 
protect against the destruction of works. For arguments against destruction, see  Edward Damich, ‘The Right of 
Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors’ (1988) 23 Georgia Law 
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even if destruction does not affect the author’s reputation, it is arguable that it can impact upon his 
honour. It is this article’s contention that there has been disproportionate emphasis or reliance on 
‘reputation’ where the integrity right is concerned, and that equal weight should be afforded ‘honour’. 
One of the main reasons why ‘honour’ has not been referred to or applied as much as ‘reputation’ lies 
in the uncertainty surrounding its meaning,10 while that of reputation has been well established, 
particularly within the law of defamation. In the few instances ‘honour’ is defined or applied however, 
it is usually defined as ‘what a person thinks of himself.’11  If so, this has a strongly subjective 
element, which poses the risk of allowing unreasonable claims by hypersensitive artists. This article 
will offer a re-interpretation of ‘honour’ which will allow for a more objective approach, thus 
avoiding the aforementioned difficulty regarding oversensitive artists. Essentially, it is suggested that 
prejudice to honour amounts to an insult, and that the destruction of an author’s work clearly amounts 
to an insult to the author, and hence prejudicial to the honour of the author.  It will be shown, from 
examining the influence Roman Law had on the early development of the common law, and from 
applying the theoretical insights of Frank Henderson Stewart, an eminent anthropologist,12 that the 
concept of ‘insult’ as a viable cause of action is not as alien to the common law as is presumed, and 
hence it would not be too much of a stretch to accept that the common law is capable of recognising 
affronts to honour, and that it is not an obsolete concept.  
If prejudice to honour amounts to an insult, the question is whether the destruction of a work 
amounts to an insult to its author and is prejudicial to his honour. The answer is arguably in the 
affirmative, taking into account, the depth of feeling an author possesses for his creations, and the 
investment of the author’s energy, creativity and personality into the creation of the work. The author 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Review 1, 18; P Anand, ‘The Concept of Moral Rights Under Indian Copyright Law’ (1993) 27 Copyright 
World 35; Irini A Stamatoudi, ‘Moral Rights of Authors in England: the Missing Emphasis on the Role of 
Creators’ (1997) 4 Intellectual Property Quarterly 478, 482-483; Mira T Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights: 
Principles, Practice and New Technology (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2011)  45; WR Cornish, D 
Llewelyn and TF Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Allied Rights  (8th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell, Limited 2013) 522.  
10 Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 257. 
11  ibid. 
12 Professor Frank H Stewart is currently Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem. His book, Honour, borne out of conducting ethnographic studies on Bedouin tribes, 
argues that the concept of ‘honour’ is essentially a right to respect. See Frank Henderson Stewart, Honor 
(University of Chicago Press 1994). 
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not only utilises his work to communicate a personal message, it also symbolises his personality. His 
desire to maintain the integrity of his work is understandable.13 Destruction of a work is therefore akin 
to destroying not only the message the author wishes to convey but also something which is an 
embodiment of his personality. The act of destruction demonstrates utter disregard and contempt for 
the work, and hence utter disregard and contempt for the author’s message and personality. 
Destruction of a cherished work surely insults and dishonours its author.  
Furthermore, as mentioned above, while much has been made of the subjectivity or 
objectivity of the moral rights provisions in judicial pronouncements and academic studies on the 
integrity right, it is submitted that, as there can be no ambiguity whatsoever as to the effect that 
destruction wreaks upon a work, any destruction of any work would amount to prejudice to an 
author’s honour without the need for evaluating the subjectivity or objectivity of the treatment meted 
out to the work.  
Any study of the word ‘honour’ will be fraught with considerable difficulty, as it is a concept 
which is not easily discernible. It has been described as a word ‘rich in connotations, but poor in 
denotation’.14 It is ultimately contended that by giving full countenance to the word ‘honour’, the 
destruction of an author’s creation does amount to an infringement of the integrity right.   
2. Method, Sources and Structure 
It is necessary at this juncture to outline and explain briefly the reasoning behind the method and 
choice of sources employed in formulating the thesis set out in this article, relying heavily as it does 
on uncommon sources, such as anthropological studies on honour, insult laws in Germany, early 
Anglo-Saxon and Norman laws, and the Roman law concept of iniuria.   
In order to achieve the aims of the article, it would be necessary to seek out authoritative 
sources for alternative and workable meanings of the concept of ‘honour’. As there is a paucity of 
                                                                 
13 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging a Moral Rights Law for the United States  (Stanford 
University Press 2010). 
14 Charles Stewart, ‘Honour and Shame’ in J Wright (ed), International Encyclopedia of the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences (2nd edn, Elsevier forthcoming 2015). 
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legal material on the concept, it is necessary to draw inspiration from a variety of sources from 
without the modern common law. The first of these sources are studies carried out by anthropologists, 
who are renowned for their extensive research into the meaning of honour. The seminal work on this 
area is Honor and Shame,15 a collection of essays edited by Peristiany, foremost of which is Pitt-
Rivers’ essay, “Honor and Social Status”, which represent the first systematic studies ever conducted 
on the concept of honour, most of which were based on ethnographic fieldwork undertaken in the 
Mediterranean.16 The choice of the Mediterranean as a focus of scholarly research for anthropologists 
was not, as it may be thought, a purely and uniquely academic and reasoned decision, but the practical 
result of tumultuous world affairs which occurred during the same period in which this particular 
group of scholars were active. The Second World War and the upheaval it caused in many countries 
for decades to come ensured that many regions were inaccessible to anthropologists.17 Decolonisation 
of many African states also meant that those areas were out of bounds.18 Thus, for practical purposes, 
the Mediterranean was the geographical area of choice, particularly for scholars writing in English.19  
It was in this area of the world that the first and most rigorous study on the concept of honour was 
undertaken, and also where the majority of anthropological research studies on ‘honour’ has taken 
place. 20 Hence, in any study of ‘honour’, as this article is, it would be necessary to refer to the work 
of Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers in the first instance, and draw out general and universal themes from 
their findings, despite the fact that their work was centred in the Mediterranean and not within an 
Anglicized or even Northern European culture or setting, which might appear to be more relevant to 
the present focus of this article. It is contended that the features of Mediterranean honour as 
discovered and described by the anthropologists are more universal in application than it would 
                                                                 
15 Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society (University of Chicago Press 1966). 
16 See Patrica M Rodriguez Mosquera, Antony SR Manstead and Agneta H Fischer, ‘Honor in the 
Mediterranean and Northern Europe’ (2002) 33 Journal of Cross -Cultural Psychology 16 for a brief outline of 
the research conducted by anthropologists on ‘honour’ in the Mediterranean. 
17 Dionigi Albera, ‘The Mediterranean as an anthropological laboratory’ [1999] Seccion de Antropologia Social 
215; Christian Giordano, ‘The Anthropology of Mediterranean Societies’ in U. Kockel, M. Nick Craith and J. 
Frykman (eds), A Companion to the Anthropology of Europe (Wiley-Blackwell 2012). 
18 Sandra Busatta, ‘Honour and Shame in the Mediterranean’ (2006) 2 Antrocom 75. 
19 Albera (n 17), 215. The question as to whether there is an anthropology of the Mediterranean as a subspecialty 
is itself a much complex and heavily argued issue within the field of anthropology: see David Gilmore, 
‘Anthropology of the Mediterranean Area’ (1982) 11 Annual Review of Anthropology 175; and Giordano (n 
17), for discussions of this issue, which is outside the scope of this article. 
20 Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer (n 16) 16. 
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appear. A recent comparative study conducted in Spain and the Netherlands concluded that 
Mediterranean notions of honour were present in Dutch culture and society, and vice versa.21   
This article will take issue with the work of Pitt-Rivers in particular, and rely on Frank 
Henderson Stewart’s work on ‘honour’, which is no less esteemed. His work, which proposed that 
honour is a right to respect or not to be insulted, was heavily influenced by German jurists and 
German insult laws. It is of course not maintained that simply because the work of German lawyers 
happened to influence Stewart in formulating his particular take on ‘honour’, it should similarly be 
applicable in English common law. Taking a cue from Lord Justice Reed, who said that ‘Foreign law 
may ... be treated as an authority, as an empirical fact, or as a source of ideas...’,22 it is suggested that 
Stewart’s and German ideas on honour are sources of ideas, from which inspiration may be taken in 
order to enlighten us on the meaning of ‘honour’.  Such use of foreign law will, as advised by Lord 
Justice Reed, ‘assist the judge to elucidate the issues under domestic law, and to identify possible 
options for their resolution’. 23 The value of learning and seeking inspiration from other legal systems 
is encapsulated in what James Gordley has written about studying foreign law, that ‘...the jurists in all 
these so-called [legal] “systems” were struggling with common problems, guided by similar concepts 
... not expressed clearly in their national legal systems.’, and that ‘...we can learn much by seeing how 
others have faced similar problems.’24   
Finally, on the basis that ‘honour’ may be interpreted as a right to respect or right not to be 
insulted, this paper will examine the Roman law concept of iniuria i.e. disrespect, insult or outrage, 
and draw from it insights which would assist in framing a workable approach to interpreting ‘honour’ 
as it is placed within moral rights law.  The use of Roman law to assist modern day common lawyers 
is not uncommon at all despite its obvious antiquity. A recent paper analysed the use of Roman law by 
the House of Lords in three relatively recent and important decisions, and argued that the influence of 
                                                                 
21  ibid (n 16) 33. 
22 Robert Reed, ‘Foreign precedents and judicial reasoning: the American debate and British practice’ (2008) 
124 Law Quarterly Review 253, 265. 
23  ibid 268. 
24 James Gordley, Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment  (Oxford University 
Press 2007) 3. 
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Roman law on the development of English common law is pervasive and of considerable value.25  The 
same paper posits that the value of Roman law (or indeed any foreign law) rests in the fact that legal 
problems are both universal and perennial.26 It is hoped that just as iniuria has proved valuable in 
informing the development of the common law of obligations, it will prove equally helpful in 
elucidating the concept of ‘honour’ in moral rights law.  
3. Honour and Destruction in Section 80 CDPA and the Berne Convention 
It is firstly necessary to examine the current legal landscape in which the concept of ‘honour’ resides, 
before we look beyond the law for inspiration.  The relevant legislative provision is section 80 CDPA, 
which was the result of the UK’s implementation of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.   
While numerous criticisms may be levied at the UK’s minimalist and inconsistent 
implementation of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, it is not the intention of this article to take 
issue with all of them, save for specific issues arising from the reference to ‘honour’ and to 
destruction of works. This section of the article firstly outlines the development of moral rights in the 
UK, followed by a consideration of the act of destrution under section 80, and a discussion of the 
interpretation of ‘honour’ in section 80 CDPA. 
A. Moral Rights in the United Kingdom 
Although the source for moral rights in the UK is the CDPA, which implemented the Berne 
Convention, such rights predate even the Berne Convention, originating in the civil law countries, 
notably France and Germany. The predominant conceptual model of the moral rights doctrine was 
developed in parallel in these two countries, through a series of mid-19th century court decisions,27 
subject to the influence of jurists, such as Morillot, Gierke and Kohler, and the philosophers Kant and 
Hegel, who espoused the view that a creation was the embodiment of its author’s personality.  
                                                                 
25 James Lee, ‘Confusio: Reference to Roman Law in the House of Lords and the Development of English 
Private Law’ (2009) 5 Roman Legal Tradition 24. 
26  ibid 38. 
27 See Adeney The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers (n 7) chapter 1; and Rajan (n 9) 51-88.  
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Although it is clear that France and Germany developed the theoretical basis for the moral 
rights doctrine, it is also equally clear that at some point English law did recognise the features of the 
doctrine as was expressed in Lord Mansfield’s judgment in the early case of Millar v Taylor (1769).28 
Lord Mansfield’s description of the evils which may befall an author was clearly a precursor of the 
moral rights doctrine:   
He is no more master of the use of his own name. He has no control over the correctness of 
his own work, He can not prevent additions. He can not retract errors. He can not amend; or 
cancel a faulty edition. Any one may print, pirate, and perpetuate the imperfections to the 
disgrace and against the will of the author; may propagate sentiments under his name, which 
he disapproves, repents and is ashamed of. 
Lord Mansfield argued that ‘It is an injury, by a faulty, ignorant and incorrect edition, to 
disgrace (the author’s) work and mislead the reader.’ Lord Mansfield’s affirmation of such a right at 
common law, was however overturned five years later in Donaldson v Beckett,29 which held that the 
common law right was supplanted by the Statute of Anne, laying to rest the question of the existence 
of moral rights in English Law.  
The original text of the Berne Convention did not provide specifically for moral rights until 
1928 at the Rome Conference when the concept was first proposed, apparently much to the surprise of 
the common law countries, and which was ‘coldly received’ by the British countries.30 The British 
contingent was eventually won over when the other delegates pointed out that what was proposed 
already existed in the common law.31  
The UK’s compliance with the Berne Convention underwent the scrutiny of the Gregory 
Committee in 1952 and again that of the Whitford Committee in 1977. Whilst the earlier Gregory 
Committee review judged that the Article 6bis rights were met with adequately in other areas of UK 
                                                                 
28 4 Burr 2303, 98 Eng Rep 201 (1769). 
29 2 Bro P C 129, 1 Eng Rep 837. 
30 S G Raymond, Report of the New Zealand Delegate on the International Copyright Conference at Rome  (21 
July 1928). 
31 For example, the law of defamation and passing-off. 
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law, (e.g. defamation, contract etc) the later review found that the UK had not met its obligations 
under Article 6bis.  In particular, where the integrity right was concerned, it was recognised by both 
committees that the UK had to rely on the law of defamation in order to fulfil its obligations in 
relation to the same. However, the Whitford Committee pointed out that in comparison with the 
integrity right formulated in Article 6bis, the law of defamation failed authors in at least two ways, 
firstly because for a defamation action to succeed, the public must have known that the claimant was 
the author and secondly, because an action for defamation dies with the person defamed, unlike the 
the integrity right which endured beyond the death of the author.32 It was not until the enactment of 
the CDPA in 1988, which included sections relating to moral rights, that the moral rights doctrine was 
formally recognised within the UK.  
B. The Status of Destruction under UK Moral Rights 
Not only is there no provision for destruction under the CDPA,33 as mentioned, one reason the 
integrity right does not include the act of destruction is the fact that nothing remains which may affect 
the author’s honour or reputation. Apart from this, other reasons have also been posited. It has been 
argued firstly that the narrow and exclusive definition of ‘treatment’ under section 80 is unable to 
encompass destruction, and secondly, that the additional requirements of section 80 subsections (3), 
(4), (5) and (6), which call for the public communication of the derogatory treatment, would exclude 
at least private acts of destruction. Although these reasons are not the main focus of this article, it is 
contended as follows that they are possibly not as obstructive as it may be thought. 
‘Treatment’ is a closed category of four distinctive acts: addition to, deletion from, alteration 
or adaptation, none of which may conceivably include ‘destruction’. There has been, to date, no actual 
case on destruction of a work in the UK, thus still leaving open the question of the UK courts’ likely 
interpretation of section 80 where destruction is concerned. Mr Justice Fysh has however commented 
                                                                 
32 Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and Designs  (Cm 6732, 1977) paras 52-53. 
33 It is worth noting that the Directive 2004/48/EC (Enforcement of IP Rights), implemented in the UK by The 
Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc.) Regulations 2006, may apply to a breach of moral rights for causing 
‘moral prejudice’, i.e. damage above and beyond economic damage. However, a t the moment, destruction does 
not appear to constitute a breach of the integrity right in the UK. This means that even if the author has been 
unduly affected by it, beyond the economic damage suffered, he is unable to claim damages for ‘moral 
prejudice’.  
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that ‘treatment’ was a ‘broad, general concept; de minimis act apart, it implies a spectrum of possible 
acts carried out on a work, from the addition of say, a single word to a poem to the destruction of an 
entire work.’34 Mr Justice Fysh further ventured that he saw ‘no legislative intention to limit the 
meaning of the word’ notwithstanding the wording of section 80(2), and that any limit to the 
generality of ‘treatment’ would arise from any prejudice which may result to the honour or reputation 
of the author.35  Mr Justice Fysh also referred to the judgment delivered in Amar Nath Seghal v Union 
of India,36 which stated that destruction could be considered the ultimate form of mutilation.37 This is 
meaningful as the relevant section of the Indian Copyright Act is similar to Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention.  
Further, it has been suggested that destruction of a work may be considered to be distortion or 
mutilation carried out to its fullest extent, 38 or the ‘ultimate infringement of [artists’] moral rights’.39 
Professor Jacques de Werra states that to destroy is to ‘nier purement et simplement l’existence de 
l’oevre, forme ultime de l’irrespect’ i.e. to ‘deny the work its existence: the ultimate form of 
disrespect’. 40 Hence, it is arguably erroneous to conclude unreservedly that ‘treatment’ does not 
include the act of destruction. 
The requirements set out in subsections (3), (4), and (6) of section 80 CDPA are a deviation 
from the requirements of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. Subsections (3) and (4) provide that 
infringement only occurs if the derogatory treatment of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is 
published commercially, exhibited, or performed in public. The subsections also specify the issuing to 
the public of copies of the film, sound recording, graphic work or photograph of the treatment. 
                                                                 
34 John P Harrison v John D Harrison, Michael Harrison t/a Streetwise Publications and Mark Hempshell 
[2010], ECDR, 3 (PCC) [60]. 
35Harrison (n 34) [60]. 
36 Judgement delivered by Judge Pradeep Nandrajog, 117 (2005) DLT 717, 2005 (30) PTC 253 Del. See Mr 
Justice Fysh’s discussion Harrison (n 34) [61].  
37 Harrison (n 34) [31].  
38 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Moral rights in English law - the shape of rights to come’ (1986) 8 European Intellectual 
Property Review 329. 
39 Simon Newman, ‘Intellectual property law: Part II—The moral right of the author: The view from France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom’ (1997) 13 Computer Law & Security Review 96.  
40 Jacques de Werra, ‘Le droit a l'integrite de l'oeuvre. Etude du droit d'aauteur suisse dans une perspective de 
droit compare’ in H. Hausheer (ed), Etudes de droit suisse (Staempfli Editions 1997), translated by Teilmann-
Lock in Stina Teilmann-Lock, British and French Copyright: A Historical Study of Aesthetic Implications  (First 
edn, DJOF Publishing 2009) 207. 
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Section 80 (6) provides that, in relation to a film, infringement occurs when the derogatory treatment 
is shown in public or copies of the derogatory treatment are distributed to the public. 
Therefore, while Article 6bis states that the author has the right to object to derogatory actions 
per se, under UK law, subsections (3), (4) and (6) provide that the author may only do so if a further 
act has taken place, i.e. that basically the derogatory treatment of his work is publicised. The author in 
the UK has no redress against derogatory treatment per se, surely a departure from the intention of 
Article 6bis.41 However, it must be pointed out that although it may be very attractive to interpret 
section 80(1) as implying a right to object to derogatory treatment itself, Professor Adeney, in 
examining the legislative history behind section 80, thinks it highly unlikely that Parliament intended 
this outcome, and that it had always intended to limit the integrity right as set out in the subsequent 
subsections in section 80.42 The manner and extent to which subsections (3), (4) and (6) may affect 
destruction are discussed below.  
The requirement in subsections (3), (4) and (6) that a further act of publication has to take 
place before infringement may be established, may present an obstacle to authors wishing to protest 
against the destruction of their works. This is especially so if, following the intricate analysis of the 
term ‘derogatory treatment’ by Davies and Garnett in Moral Rights, ‘derogatory treatment’ is 
interpreted as ‘the result of an action’, rather than ‘the action of treating a work’.43 Davies and 
Garnett assert that the use of ‘derogatory treatment’ in the CDPA is ambiguous and is used in both 
possible senses. However, where subsections (3), (4) and (6) are concerned, the authors construe 
‘derogatory treatment’ as clearly being ‘the result of an action’.44  
Evidently, if this is the case, total destruction of a work would leave nothing behind, i.e. there 
will not be any tangible result post act, and thus, could not be ‘commercially published’ for the 
purposes of section 80(3) or form the subject of a photograph or graphic work for the purposes of 
                                                                 
41 Adeney (n 7) para14.85. 
42 ibid paras 14.83-14.84. 
43 See Davies and Garnett (n 7) para 8-026, at which the authors engaged in an analysis of the term ‘derogatory 
treatment’ in their discussion of the situation where a work is subject to a first treatment and its result subject to 
a subsequent treatment. Their analysis suggests that the term is used in both senses within the Act at different 
points, i.e. either as the action of treating a work, or as the result of the action.  
44 ibid. 
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section 80(4)(c). It is submitted that this particular interpretation of ‘derogatory treatment’, even for 
the purposes of subsections 80(3) and 80(4), is not absolutely clear and consistent. While it may be 
arguable that perhaps only the result of a treatment may be ‘commercially published’, ‘exhibited’ or 
be the subject of a photograph, the other acts stipulated in the subsections do not necessarily imply the 
same. For instance, section 80(3) also lists ‘performs in public...a derogatory treatment of the work’, 
which seems to suggest the action of treating a work. In such a situation, the public burning of a book 
or painting may fulfil this requirement. It could also be argued that the showing of a film of burning 
an artwork may fulfil section 80(4)(b).45 Therefore, it is arguable that the public destruction of a work 
of art may fulfil these additional requirements, although it must be noted that a private act of 
destruction may possibly be excluded.46 
C. ‘Honour’ in section 80 CDPA and Article 6bis Berne Convention 
The original proposed wording of Article 6bis at the Rome Conference referred to acts ‘which (are) 
prejudicial to moral interests’. The phrase raised grave concerns among the common law delegates 
who felt that the words were too vague to give any useful guidance or instruction. The wording was 
eventually amended to refer to acts ‘which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation’,47 which 
apparently was accepted without demurrer by the UK, and sealed its acceptance of Article 6bis 
notwithstanding its initial hostility to the proposal. 
A few preliminary observations may be made on the inclusion of ‘honour or reputation’ in 
both Article 6bis and section 80. Firstly, although the phrase ‘moral interests’ in the original wording 
was deemed too vague, the inclusion of ‘honour’ has not served to remove ambiguity either, as its 
meaning is hardly consistent or settled. In contrast, reputation has a more established or familiar 
                                                                 
45 s 80(4)(b) provides that ‘In the case of an artistic work the right is infringed by a person who shows in public 
a film including a visual image of a derogatory treatment of the work or issues to the public copies of such a 
film.’ 
46 Marjut Salokannel, Alain Strowel and with Estelle Derclaye, ‘Study contract concerning moral rights in the 
context of the exploitation of works through digital technology: Final Report’ Study Contract no oETD/99/B5-
3000/Eo <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/etd1999b53000e28_en.pdf.> accessed 30 
September 2014, 143. 
47 Piola Caselli, the Italian delegate, reported that the representatives of the common law tradition had called for 
greater precision than “moral interests”. See General Report of the Drafting Committee, 204.  
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definition,48 owing especially to its application in defamation law. This may also explain why judicial 
considerations of the integrity right appear to have focused on reputation rather than honour. For 
instance, in Tidy v Trustees of the Natural History Museum,   49 in which the plaintiff’s cartoons were 
reproduced in a reduced size and colourised, Mr Justice Rattee could not conclude that there was 
prejudice to honour or reputation in the absence of any evidence from the public as to how the 
coloured reproduction would affect the plaintiff’s reputation.50 While Mr Justice Fysh in Harrison 
neither distinguished between honour and reputation nor explained the concepts in any detail, he made 
a similar point, referring to Confetti Records v Warner Music,51that it was not easy to assess honour 
and reputation of which there had to be evidence. Furthermore, Mr Justice Fysh specifically referred 
to professional honour or reputation, although no further explanation is given for this restriction.52 As 
evidence of professional honour or reputation would generally come in the form of public opinion, 
again this echoes the test for reputation in defamation law. 
Academic writers have also focused more on reputation. Although the authors in Copinger & 
Skone James on Copyright attempt to distinguish between reputation (by defining it as ‘what is 
generally said or believed about the person’) and honour (by defining it as ‘associated with reputation 
and good name,...respect and position’), it is submitted that since their definitions of both concepts 
utilize very similar terms, they have not succeeded in making the distinction.53 Furthermore, they 
assert that a claim under section 80 would require evidence that members of the public are likely to 
think less of the author, which echoes the test in defamation law, and which relates to ‘reputation’ 
rather than to ‘honour’. Indeed, the authors do assert at the start of their discussion that the 
                                                                 
48 Loughlan (n 3) 189-190. See Bently and Sherman (n 10) 256-257 who state that ‘the notion of reputation used 
in this context would be similar to that which is employed in defamation law’; Jon Holyoak and Paul 
Torresmans, Intellectual Property Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 260; and Griffiths (n 7) para 
9.41 
49 [1996] 31 IPR 501 (HC). See Bina Cunningham, ‘Moral rights’ (1996) 18 European Intellectual Property 
Review D81 for a discussion of the case. 
50 It should be remembered that Tidy was an action for summary judgment and hence there was little scope for 
more in-depth discussion of the issue.  
51 Confetti Records, Fundamental Records and Andrew Alcee v Warner Music UK Ltd (t/a East West Records) 
EWHC (2003) ECDR, 1274 (Ch) [157]. 
52 John P Harrison v John D Harrison, Michael Harrison t/a Streetwise Publications and Mark Hempshell  
(n34) [64].  
53 K M Garnett and others, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright  (Sweet & Maxwell 2011) in Part II, para 
11-45. 
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requirement for prejudice to honour or reputation bears ‘close resemblance to existing personal rights 
under the law of defamation and passing-off’. The word ‘reputation’ is also used on its own several 
times in the relevant passages on this issue, without reference to ‘honour’. Mr Justice Overend, in 
discussing the meaning of ‘honour and reputation’ in Pasterfield v Denham,54 referred  to Laddie, 
Prescott and Vitoria, who explained that the concept in the Act is ‘akin to libel’, 55 while Cornish, 
writing on the introduction of moral rights in the CDPA , thought that the reference to ‘honour or 
reputation’ had only a marginal advance, if any, on the concept of defamation.56  
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the concept of honour, the fact remains that ‘honour’ is 
specifically included in not only an international treaty but also in the national legislation. Academic 
and judicial disregard for the same is therefore questionable. If honour is to be disregarded, there must 
be good reason for doing so. At present, there is little rationale for this treatment. 
Another explanation for the scant attention paid to honour lies in treating ‘honour’ as 
synonymous with ‘reputation’. The interpretation of ‘honour and reputation’ favoured by judges and 
academics alike seem to favour the definition of reputation as it is established in libel law. The 
possible reason for such interpretation lies in the wording of section 80, i.e. ‘prejudicial to the honour 
or reputation of the author or director’. It mirrors the English version of Article 6bis but is subtly 
different to that of the French version of Article 6bis i.e. ‘prejudicial to his honour or to his 
reputation’.  While it is possible for ‘honour’ and ‘reputation’ to be treated interchangeably in the 
English version and the UK legislation, there is no such ambiguity in the French version.57 If there is a 
divergence in interpretation, the question is which text should take precedence. While the Paris text of 
the Berne Convention provides that both the English and French versions of the Berne Convention are 
authoritative,58 Article 37(1)(c) provides that, in differences of interpretation, the French version shall 
                                                                 
54 Pasterfield v Denham and Another [1999] FSR 168, 181. 
55 Prescott and Vitoria Laddie, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (2nd edn, 1995)  para 27.18,1016.  
56 W R Cornish, ‘Moral rights under the 1988 Act’ (1989) 11 European Intellectual Property Review 449. 
57 Adeney, ‘The moral right of integrity: the past and future of "honour"’ (n 4). 
58 Article 37(1)(a) of the Paris Text of the Berne Convention states that ‘This Act shall be signed in a single 
copy in the French and English languages...’ while Article 33(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
states that where a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text in each language is equally 
authoritative unless the treaty provides that in the case of divergence, one of the languages will preva il, thus 
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prevail, which renders the French version of the Berne Convention as the final and most authoritative 
version of the Berne Convention.59 Therefore, if preference is given to the French version in this 
regard, then it is clear that ‘honour’ and ‘reputation’ have different meanings and that they play 
different roles. Further, according to Adeney, the fact that the delegates at the 1948 Brussels 
Conference in considering a revision of Article 6bis opted to retain both “honour” and “reputation” 
clearly indicated that they viewed “reputation” and “honour” as distinctly separate concepts, and that 
honour supplemented reputation. 60  
The question that remains is what exactly is the definition of ‘honour’? As stated above, there 
is a myriad of definitions of honour, and scholars in different fields have expounded conflicting 
theories on the concept of honour. While it would not be possible to seek out a definitive conception 
of honour, for present purposes, a more constructive approach would be to seek out a theory of honour 
which would be of most assistance to common law lawyers, particularly those interested in the 
concept as applied within moral rights 
4. Tracing the Meaning of ‘Honour’: the Anthropological View 
As the common law appears unable to provide any guidance on the meaning of ‘honour’, guidance is 
sought from other academic fields in order to illuminate this elusive concept. It must be cautioned that 
even within the field of anthropology, where the concept has been given more coverage and attention 
than it has been given in the legal field, the concept is nevertheless subject to numerous disagreements 
among anthropologists.  
Anthropologists have researched into the concept in great depth, by participating in 
ethnographic research of various communities in the Mediterranean in particular. Indeed, 
‘anthropologists now seem to be considered the experts on the subject [i.e. ‘honour’]’.61 Not all 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
providing that both the French and English versions are the authentic and authoritative versions of the Berne 
Convention unless there is a divergence in interpretation.  
59 Martin Sentfleben, Copyright, Limitations, and the Three-step Test: An Analysis of the Three-Step Test in 
International and EC Copyright Law (Kluwer Law International 2004) 114. 
60 See discussion of the delegates’ views on ‘honour’ at the Brussels Revision Conference in 1948 in Adeney, 
‘The moral right of integrity: the past and future of "honour"’ (n 4) 124. 
61 Stewart (n 12) ix. 
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variations of the concept as defined by anthropologists will be relevant to moral rights law, being as 
they are, concentrated on issues related to social phenomena such as battlefield bravery, shame in 
adultery, honour killings and duels. However, it is possible to tease out the central and general themes 
which may be of assistance to lawyers.  This is by no means the first and only attempt to make 
reference to anthropology in ascertaining the meaning of honour; John Beckerman, for instance, refers 
briefly to the work of anthropologists in his essay on honour and trespass,62 although not in any depth. 
Julian Pitt-Rivers, the renowned anthropologist, is regarded as ‘the leading authority on 
honour’,63 and considered as ‘anthropology’s chief explicator on honour and shame.’64 As such, it is 
necessary to engage in the first instance with what he had to say on the subject, before proceeding to 
consider other notions of ‘honour’, in particular the definition expounded by Stewart, which as will be 
argued, is central to the thesis developed in this article. Pitt-Rivers’ seminal essay, Honour and Social 
Status,65 was a study of Andalusian pueblo, a series of towns or villages in Spain.  He discovered 
different variations on the meaning of honour as it manifested in these communities, ranging from the 
loss of honour as a result of cuckoldry, preservation of honour through the preservation of a woman’s 
virtue and the differences in the systems of honour as understood between the upper and lower strata 
of society. His essay was not only an observation of these different manifestations of honour, but it 
also provided, in its first part, a brief description of honour as understood in Western European 
society generally. Indeed, through his study, he concludes that ‘not only what is honourable but what 
honour is have varied within Europe from one period to another, from one region to another and 
above all from one class to another.’66  Notwithstanding his observation of honour as a shifting and 
variable concept, he does, at the start of his essay, drill down the basic themes of honour, which is 
defined thus: ‘Honour is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society. It is 
his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, 
                                                                 
62 John S. Beckerman, ‘Adding Insult to Iniuria: Affronts to Honor and the Origins of Trespass’ in Morris S. 
Arnold and others (eds), On the Laws and Customs of England: Essays in Honor of Samuel E Thorne  (The 
University of North Carolina Press 1981). 
63 Stewart (n 12) 1. 
64 Susan Tax Freeman, ‘Julian A Pitt-Rivers (1919-2001)’ (2004) 106 American Anthropologist 216. 
65 Julian Pitt-Rivers , ‘Honour and Social Status’ in Jean G. Peristiany (ed), Honour and Shame: the Values of 
Mediterranean Society (University of Chicago Press 1966). 
66  ibid 
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his excellence recognised by society, his right to pride.’ In this definition, apart from references to the 
subject’s perception or estimation of his own value, honour does take on features which are more 
familiar to the concept of reputation. The question is whether Pitt-Rivers’ definition is, being as it is 
formulated by someone who is regarded as a leading authority on honour, the final word on the 
matter?   
Whilst Pitt-Rivers’ reputation as a leading exponent of the concept of honour is undisputed, 
there is criticism to be made about his approach to studying the concept, in particular, his declaration 
that very little has been said on the subject,67 apart from medieval and chivalric references to 
honour.68 As fellow anthropologist Stewart points out in Honor, much sophisticated work on the 
concept has been undertaken by jurists, in particular, German jurists in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, whose works appear to have been ignored by Pitt-Rivers.69 Hence, it would appear that Pitt-
Rivers’ definition, authoritative as it may be, is not absolute. Stewart presents an alternative theory 
which, influenced as it is by legal writings, may be of considerable assistance to common law lawyers 
who are interested in the concept of honour. 
Essentially, Stewart’s concept of honour is that it is a right to respect or as having a certain 
worth.70  By viewing honour as such, it accounts for insults, which he says the Pitts-River account 
does not. As mentioned above, Pitt-Rivers’ two pronged definition of honour involves self-evaluation 
as well as valuation by society, in other words, there is an inner quality of honour as well as an outer 
one. He was not the only one to have explained honour as such.  Schopenhauer, in his work, The 
Wisdom of Life, declares honour as ‘on its objective side, other people’s opinion of what we are 
worth; on its subjective side, it is the respect we pay to this opinion.’  Stewart attacks this formulation 
of honour, what he calls the ‘bipartite’ theory of honour. He says that it does not account for the 
                                                                 
67 Julian Pitt-Rivers, ‘La Maladie de l'honneur’ in Marie Gautheron (ed), L'honneur: image de soi ou don de soi 
un ideal equivoque (Editions Autrement 1991). 
68 Of which, Falstaff’s speech in Henry the Fourth Part 1 is an example.  
69 Pitt-Rivers in turn has critically reviewed Honor, saying that Stewart did not seem interested in the different 
senses of the word as used in the Mediterranean, and has not discussed in detail various studies conducted by 
other anthropologists on the Bedouin. Essentially, without actually addressing Stewart’s main thesis that honour 
is a right to respect, Pitt-Rivers criticises Honor as not doing what it says on the tin. Julian Pitt-Rivers, ‘Review 
of Frank Henderson Stewart's Honor’ [EHESS] (1997) 37 L'Homme 215. 
70 Stewart (n 12) 21. 
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meting out of insults, which is still an offence in much of Europe.71 He cites the example of being 
called a ‘swine’. Such name calling, under the bipartite formulation, would neither damage the inner 
quality of honour, nor the outer quality of honour, especially if not made in public. However, such 
name calling is clearly an insult, which amounts to an offence. His solution, to recognise honour as a 
right, essentially a right (or claim) to respect,72 would account for insults, in other words we have a 
right not to be insulted. While honour may be a right or claim by the individual to respect, the world 
has a duty to treat the bearer of honour with respect.73 The utility of the concept of honour as a right to 
the fields of anthropology and ethnology is that it is a feature which is widely shared among different 
cultures.74 Where the law is concerned, by framing the otherwise nebulous concept of honour as a 
right, it appeals naturally to lawyers, and could serve to clarify honour’s meaning and utility when 
calls for its application are made, as is in the case of Article 6bis and section 80. It is also appealing 
for lawyers to apply Stewart’s conception of honour as a right, as his thesis was influenced profoundly 
by German legal literature of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.75  
Stewart’s model of honour thus owes its formulation to German juristic literature on German 
insult laws.  As recent as the 1950s and 1960s, the German courts defined honour as a right. 
According to Stewart, a German Federal Court defined honour as ‘the right of a human being that 
their personality be respected’. 76 Stewart very briefly traces the lineage of this right in German law 
back to Kant’s axiom which declared that ‘Every man has a legitimate claim to respect from his 
                                                                 
71 International PEN's Writers in Prison Committee, Insult Laws in the European Union, A Silent Threat  (2007) 
72 Stewart (n 12) 146-7. 
73  ibid 21. 
74 Stanley Brandes, ‘Review of Honor by Frank Henderson Stewart’ (1996) 23 American Ethnologist 151. The 
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North Africa: Yahya-u-Tacfuft and Portugese Noble Culture’ (2001) 32 The Sixteenth Century Journal 67. It 
has been relied heavily in at least one study on a case of honour killing: see Antonio Sorge, ‘Review of In Honor 
of Fadime: Shame and Murder by Unni Wikan’ (2008) 50 Anthropologica 435. 
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fellow man’,77 and discussed this claim or right to respect in close connection to the concept of 
honour.78  
There is therefore a school of thought, rooted in philosophy, law and through Stewart, 
anthropology, which has actively advanced the idea that honour is simply a right to respect. Indeed, a 
paper published in 2001 on ‘honour’ in the Australian Copyright Act also puts forward this claim, 
although on different basis, by simply referring to the definition of the word ‘honour’ in the New 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,79 and to the Australian Attorney-General’s speech on the 
amendments to the Australian Copyright Act.80 Interestingly, although it is mentioned earlier that 
according to Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria ‘honour and reputation’ is ‘akin to libel’, they also make the 
point that ‘any treatment of a work which tends to trivialise it and to diminish the respect (emphasis 
author’s) in which either the work or the author is held runs the risk of a successful action being 
brought.’81    
Respect in turn is defined as either the ‘deferential regard or esteem felt or shown towards a 
person’ when used as a noun,82 or as a verb, ‘to bear in mind, think of, consider’.83  It is surely 
uncontroversial to assert that, more often than not, the destruction of an artist’s creation neither 
reflects deep admiration or esteem of the artist on the one hand, nor due regard for his feelings or 
wishes on the other.  Indeed, destruction of the work clearly amounts to an insult or contempt for the 
author of the work.84  
5. The Right to Respect or Right not to be Insulted in early English common law 
                                                                 
77 The Metaphysics of Morals (first published 1797). 
78 Stewart (n 12) 152. 
79 ‘Honour’ is defined as ‘high respect, esteem, deferential admiration; an expression of this;...’ and when used 
as a verb, as to ‘pay respect or do honour to by some outward action; ...regard with honour, respect highly’ in 
the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary cited in Ellionson and Symonds (n 6) 625. 
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81 Laddie, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (n 55) 1017. 
82 OED online (accessed 5 August 2014). 
83 OED online (accessed 6 August 2014). 
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While there is a case for defining honour as a right to respect, the difficulty for common law lawyers 
lies in recognising the existence of such a right in the common law. The closest cause of action to a 
right or claim to respect is defamation, which is well established in the common law, and which 
explains the tendency among common law judges and academics to refer solely to reputation when 
dealing with section 80. However, there is a reason why the Berne Convention referred to both honour 
and reputation, instead of simply one or the other, or why the authoritative French wording of Article 
6bis made a distinct demarcation between honour and reputation. If the inclusion of honour was 
regarded as tautologous, it would neither have been included in the first formulation of Article 6bis in 
1928 nor retained in subsequent revisions to the Berne Convention.  Hence, it is arguable at least that 
the intention of the drafting committee in 1928 as well as that of the delegates to subsequent 
conferences on the Berne Convention must have been to introduce two distinct terms, and therefore, 
honour is not and should not be treated the same as reputation.  
It will be shown that honour, defined as the right to respect, has played at least an historical 
role within English common law, and that it is not a completely alien concept. The general position 
however is that ‘Anglo-American law today is extremely chary of redressing injuries to feelings, 
honor, or reputation’.85 Generally, an action lies only if there is loss or damage to some interest which 
can be adequately compensated in monetary terms.  Even the law of defamation is based on the 
economic loss to the claimant as a result of injury to his reputation, rather than the affront caused by 
the libel to personal dignity.86  The question is why the common law has developed this aversion to 
recognising injuries to feelings or honour,87 and whether this is truly the position in the common law.  
What is clear is that legal historians have unveiled evidence of the recognition of such rights 
or claims at certain points in the course of England’s history.  Beckerman in particular has observed 
that while the common law does appear to have ignored insults or affronts to honour altogether, at 
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some stage in its history, honour played a more central role.88 For instance, he notes that it is well 
established that Anglo-Saxon laws paid more attention to the injured feelings or wounded honour of 
the victim rather than to the actual conduct of the wrongdoer.89  Moreover, the satisfaction of honour 
remained an important part of the settlement of any dispute from the Norman Conquest until at least 
the thirteenth century.90 While pleas in the royal courts in the thirteenth century rarely included claims 
for dishonour, they appeared more frequently in those brought before the local courts.91 The claims 
for dishonour were in relation to a wide range of wrongs (including breach of contract, defamation 
and assault for example) and were awarded damages separate from those claimed for the actual 
wrong.92 Further, in a few cases, the amount claimed for dishonour far exceeded that claimed for the 
actual wrong, thus indicating that the crux of such claims concerned the dishonour itself, similar to 
claims brought for iniuria under Roman law, i.e. the insult caused by the wrong.93    
6. Iniuria in Roman Law 
Iniuria, translated as ‘insult’ or ‘outrage’ may be defined as ‘any contumelious disregard of another’s 
rights or personality’, 94 as opposed to economic loss. Whilst originally the concept focused on 
physical assaults, it widened to include specific wrongs loosely similar to sexual harassment and 
defamation, and eventually was grounded by an unifying principle of contumelia or contempt. 95 
Essentially, by the classical period (from 1st century CE), the wide variety of wrongs that were 
brought under the umbrella of iniuria, were related by the contempt shown to the victim.96  
                                                                 
88  ibid. 
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Iniuria is so called from that which happens non iure (i.e. unlawfully); for everything which 
does not come about iure is said to occur iniuria. This is general. But specifically, iniuria is 
said to be contumelia. 97  
Contumelia, was equated in Justinian’s Institutes to the Greek hubris,98 which in turn has been 
referred to by Peter Birks as ‘a kind of arrogance or pride’,99 or simply contempt in English.  The 
delict interfered with one’s right to an equality of respect,100 or is simply ‘disrespect’.101 The 
contemptuous act is exercised without taking into account the interests or feelings of the victim.102 
While it was a condition of iniuria that there must be an intent to insult, contumelia could also be 
presumed from the intentional commission of the act, although this was a rebuttable presumption.103 It 
should also be noted that in relation to pre-classical (second and third period BCE) iniuria, special 
edicts were pronounced to impose liability in new previously unrecognised situations.104 It would 
appear that for two of the special edicts issued, only acts which were contra bonos mores i.e. those 
contrary to the social mores of the prevailing standards, attracted liability.105 Further, a special edict 
which dealt with infamia or ‘shaming’ required the subjective intent of the offender in order to attract 
liability.106 This was to deal with seemingly lawful acts which are intended to cause offence to the 
victim of such acts, as ‘some shades of intent could turn lawful conduct unlawful.’107  
Another condition for the operation of an action based on iniuria was that the victim must 
have expressed his dismay or anger as soon as he was apprised of the facts pertaining to the 
offence.108 It was insufficient to show he was the victim; he must react to the offence. The idea behind 
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this rule is not clear and is subject to several possible theories, 109 detailed discussion of which is 
beyond the scope of this article.  
The role that iniuria plays in the common law has been explored to a great extent by scholars 
in Roman law, as well as scholars of laws pertaining to those jurisdictions which have evolved laws 
rooted in Roman law, famously, Scotland and South Africa.110 Peter Birks, in his lecture Harassment 
and Hubris,111 thought that ‘the common law is much nearer than is often thought to a full recognition 
of the Roman tort,...’. The scholars in these fields have found that analysing the common law through 
the lens of the Roman tort to be instructive, for instance, it can be seen through this lens that the 
availability of enhanced or aggravated damages reflects the common law’s recognition that insulting 
behaviour or attitude deserved to be penalised.112  
It is not intended to present the various arguments and lines of evidence which showcase the 
extent to which features of iniuria appear within the common law. There is already a body of 
scholarship which has made the point. The recognition of iniuria like principles within the common 
law enables the recognition of sub-interests such as privacy for example, which hitherto have never 
enjoyed full protection or recognition in the common law.113 Lawyers and judges in the common law 
need not exercise their creative powers in stretching the scope of established categories of tort in order 
to encompass cases which, although clearly involving the commission of a wrong of some type, do 
not however tick all the boxes of any of the established torts.114  
General concepts therefore such as contumelia, the right to respect, or affronts to honour, 
have not been entirely alien to the common law. These themes, originally formulated and rooted in 
Roman law, have manifested themselves in various guises in the common law. Just as studying and 
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understanding how iniuria operated assists in helping the common law of tort to evolve, likewise, it 
furnishes us, for our present purposes, at least some guidance as to how ‘honour’, as it is provided for 
under section 80, may be applied.  
7. The Interpretation of Honour in section 80, and its Effect on Destruction 
A. An Interpretation of Honour 
Honour, thus, can be seen to mean the right to respect, not only as a mere definition in a dictionary, 
but also in the fields of anthropology and the law. This is, despite its many variations, its consistent 
key characteristic. Further, as stated above, iniuria, which is arguably a source of personality offences 
in modern law, appeared to focus on the offender’s act, rather than the victim’s actual feelings. What 
this means is that for an action to be established in iniuria, although it was necessary that the victim 
felt belittled or angered or offended in some way, and that he made known his feelings,115 it was also 
sufficient and it was not necessary to examine his feelings any further than that in order to ascertain if 
they were reasonably held. The delict instead focuses on the intention of the offender so that even if 
he had committed a strictly lawful act, this could attract liability if he had acted with contempt 
towards his victim.  
Thus, instead of interpreting ‘honour’ as ‘what a person thinks of himself’,116 we can interpret 
honour in section 80 as underscoring the author’s right to be treated with respect, in relation to how 
his work is treated by third parties.117 While the victim’s actual feelings are obviously important as 
they constitute the injury which has been suffered, by focusing more on the offending nature of the act 
itself and also requiring an objective inquiry into the intent of the offender, i.e. by asking if the 
offender’s act was clearly meant to be offensive, it lessens the subjectivity element in section 80. 
Simply put, instead of having to ask if the victim actually feels offended by the act in question and 
whether it was reasonable for him to have felt so, it would only be necessary to ask if the defendant’s 
                                                                 
115 Confetti Records, Fundamental Records and Andrew Alcee v Warner Music UK Ltd (t/a East West Records)  
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act is objectively insulting according to prevailing norms, i.e. contra bonos mores, an approach which 
may also be borrowed from pre-classical iniuria.   
As Stewart has noted, calling someone a swine is obviously offensive, and the victim of the 
name calling should have the right not to be offended as such. Obvious offence is for instance also 
conveyed by intentionally spitting in another’s face, although it may not necessarily be so by the 
actual hitting of another, even though the extent of physical injury meted out by hitting would be 
greater than that caused by spitting.118 This is because there may be some very good and inoffensive 
reason for hitting another for example, in self-defence or in jest perhaps, but it is difficult to think of 
an inoffensive reason for deliberately spitting in another’s face however. Spitting in another’s face is 
obviously meant to be offensive. Such an approach would not only assist in addressing concerns in 
allowing the unreasonable claims of oversensitive writers and artists,119 but would also capture acts 
which are objectively offensive but not necessarily detrimental to reputation. For example, a parody 
of a work would rarely be mistaken by the public as the work of the original author, and hence not 
affect his reputation.120 Aside from the fact that the original author might feel offended by the parody, 
it is clear that a parody is generally obviously intended to generate mirth at the expense of the original 
work and its author, and at best, poke gentle fun at them. There is an obvious element of offence 
meant in such a situation.121  
Colourisation of films too is an issue which may be addressed by this. If done skilfully, and in 
today’s sophisticated film studios and computer laboratories this is usually the case,122 it is unlikely 
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that the audience would think any less of the original film maker, and hence his reputation would 
most likely remain intact. There are economic reasons why broadcasting companies colourise films 
and television programs. The main reason is that it is increasingly difficult to syndicate black and 
white films, and by colourising them, there is scope for airing them to a much wider audience. 
However, there has been much opposition to this process,123 not only for films made in the non-colour 
era, but also in the period when coloured film technology was readily available. Particularly when 
colourisation was an option at the time the film was made, and the film was consciously filmed in 
black and white, the colourisation would be objectively offensive to the film director as it has not only 
altered the integrity of his work, it has altered the director’s artistic vision, and questioned his choice 
of artistic medium.  According to Woody Allen who has chosen to create some films in black and 
white, ‘To change someone’s work without any regard to his wishes shows a total contempt for film, 
for the director and for the public.’124 The film director’s reputation with film audiences may well 
remain intact especially if the colourisation was performed skilfully and tastefully, or if the audience 
is made aware that the colourisation was effected by a third party, but not only would the director be 
likely to feel offended, the colourisation of his black and white artistic vision is objectively offensive 
and therefore prejudicial to his honour. 
Further, by looking at the intention of the offender, seemingly lawful conduct may become 
unlawful, as we have already seen above in the discussion on iniuria. It can be seen that this aspect of 
the delict in particular, if applied to moral rights, would play a significant role. For instance, prima 
facie, the owner of an artwork has private property rights over that artwork and ostensibly has the 
right to do whatever he wishes with it. Should he choose to maltreat or even destroy it however, he 
would be perfectly within his legal rights to do so.  125 The maltreatment/destruction is therefore a 
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lawful act. However, in maltreating/destroying the artwork without due regard for the feelings of its 
author, the owner has acted contemptuously, and such an act could conceivably be an iniuria.  
It has to be pointed out here that care must be taken in automatically drawing this conclusion. 
There is an inevitable tension between the owner’s property rights over an artwork and the moral 
rights of the artist. It is recognised that there are situations in which the owner’s reasons for 
destroying the artwork are not only understandable, but also good and valid, and more importantly 
they reasonably override considerations of any regard for the artist, and hence not necessarily 
constitute an iniuria. Indeed, Paul in D.47.10.33 seemed to regard contra bonos mores as an essential 
element for liability in iniuria:  
Where something is done in the public interest according to sound morals, even though it is to 
the disrespect of someone, nevertheless, because the magistrate does it not with a mind to 
doing iniuria but to assert public maiestas, he is not liable to an action iniuriarum.  
While the text is a little confusing because the reference to the magistrate is not explained, 
nevertheless, it is clear that according to Paul, the absence of contra bonos mores, excluded liability in 
iniuria.126  
For instance, if the owner either merely takes a dislike to the artwork or rejects it on some 
ideological ground, it is an understandable reason for destroying it, but it is not necessarily a good 
and valid reason to simply destroy the artwork without more or indeed a sound public interest reason. 
Indeed, if the reason for destroying the work is based on ideological grounds, this amounts to an 
outright rebuff of the artist’s vision. Destroying an artwork under such circumstances demonstrates 
utter disregard for the artist’s feelings and hence is contumelious.  There are many examples of this, 
ranging from the destruction by Lady Churchill of Sutherland’s portrait of Winston Churchill (which 
is discussed below), to the destruction of Diego Rivera’s mural, Man at Crossroads at the behest of its 
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commissioner, the Rockefellers.127 Another example is the insidious practice of cutting up artworks 
into pieces, mainly for profit, as the separate sales of individual pieces may add up to more than the 
asking price for the artwork in its entirety. Such a travesty occurred in 1986 when a Picasso linocut 
print was cut up into 500 separate pieces by an Australian mail order company.128  
On the other hand, an example of a good and valid reason which could legitimately override 
any concern for the artist would be public health and safety. In 2010, for health and safety reasons, 
security staff at the Royal College of Art destroyed a student artwork which consisted of a stairway 
erected between the college’s building and a fish and chip shop next door.  Although sympathetic 
towards the student artist’s plight, the college rector emphasised that the safety of students and 
visitors would not be put at risk for the sake of maintaining the work.129 However, health and safety 
reasons have been raised in the past on spurious grounds, primarily as a smokescreen for the true 
sentiments behind the destruction of artworks. Jacob Epstein’s nude statues on the British Medical 
Association’s headquarters sparked intense controversy from the moment they were unveiled. For a 
period of almost thirty years, a continuous campaign was waged from different quarters against the 
statues. When finally part of one statue fell onto the street below, this gave the then owner of the 
building a reason to destroy the works. Mundy, art historian and Head of Collection Research at the 
Tate Modern, laments that ‘...what had been a grand public statement by one of the greatest modernist 
sculptors...was lost, notionally on the dubious, and somewhat inglorious grounds of ‘health and 
safety’.’130  
Nowhere is the tension between property rights, public interest and moral rights more 
apparent than in legal dispute which raged over Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc, a monolithic steel wall 
which traversed Federal Plaza in New York. Office workers from the buildings which surrounded the 
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plaza were infuriated with the structure, and petitioned its removal. A security expert gave evidence as 
to the sculpture’s propensity for encouraging criminal and terrorist activity. As a result, the owners 
held a public hearing, at which almost two hundred artists and experts gave testimony in the 
sculpture’s favour. The panel, after hearing both views, those of the public as well as those of the art 
world, chose to remove the sculpture. A furious Serra then sued the government agency which 
commissioned the work, claiming a breach of his moral rights. The court dismissed his claim, ruling 
that it was the property of the agency and therefore it had the right to dispose of the work. According 
to Serra, the legal outcome ‘[affirmed] the government’s commitment to private property over the 
interests of art or free expression.’131  
The above discussion demonstrates the inherent tension between property rights and moral 
rights, an issue which deserves a more in-depth discussion. This article merely makes the point that 
while the owner who destroys an artwork in his possession may simply be exercising his legal rights, 
unless there are good, valid and overriding reasons for the destruction, it amounts to a contumelious 
disregard for the artist. A further point may also be made that the owner of a work of art is its 
guardian, responsible for its posterity.132  
Further, as discussed above in the introduction, the product of a creative process practised in 
the fine arts is the embodiment of its author’s personality, and hence callous destruction of the product 
would amount to callous disregard for the personality of its author, and is prima facie insulting. Any 
maltreatment or the destruction of the artwork may therefore raise at least a presumption of contempt 
towards the artist, attracting liability.  It should be remembered that only a rebuttable presumption is 
raised, so that in a few instances, such an act could possibly be deemed inoffensive. An example 
would be when an artist, with the full consent of another artist, destroys the work of the second artist. 
Exactly such a situation occurred when Robert Rauschenberg, with Willem de Kooning’s permission, 
erased one of de Kooning’s works, in order to create a ‘new’ work. In an interview, Rauschenberg 
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explained that he ‘...erased the de Kooning not out of any negative response.’133  This arguably was 
not a situation where the destroyer clearly intended to offend the author of the destroyed work. 
It is important at this juncture to briefly contrast the aforementioned examples of parodies and 
the colourisation of films with the act of destruction generally. It could be argued that parodies and 
the colourisation of films are arguably creative works in their own right. Much skill and creativity 
goes into the creation of a good and humorous parody, and above all, they also play a valuable role as 
a form of criticism of the work on which they are based, and as such it has been argued that the law 
should recognise protection for such forms of work. 134 Again, much skill and creativity goes into the 
selection of the appropriate hues and contrasts in producing a sympathetic colourised version of a 
black and white film, and colourised versions will make black and white films more palatable and 
accessible to modern audiences today. Arguably there are possible public interests in these activities. 
There is therefore an argument that caution should be exercised in imposing restrictions on activities 
which are arguably creative and socially beneficial, and that an author’s honour may not necessarily 
override such public interests. Destruction on the other hand leaves nothing in its wake. Apart from 
the Rauschenberg episode, there is nothing creative about destroying a work of art, and generally, one 
is hard pressed to find a public interest in the destruction of a creative work.135  A detailed discussion 
of the relative merits of parodies, colourisation and ‘destruction as art’ is beyond the scope of this 
article and it suffices to remind ourselves that, in the absence of a clear statutory exception, and 
bearing in mind the above arguments, the courts may exercise restraint in deeming creative acts such 
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as parodies and colourisation as treatments prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the original 
authors.  
B. Honour v Reputation – Effect on Destruction 
Honour, in contrast to reputation, is not concerned with public knowledge of the act which interferes 
with his work. As stated above, reputation is, unlike honour, essentially economic in character. The 
ruination of an author’s public image or his reputation will in turn impinge upon his future income. 
Thus, this is why the courts, in discussing cases involving the author’s integrity right, have been so 
concerned with the final “product” after the alleged maltreatment by the defendant. Does the work, 
after being subject to the defendant’s treatment, have the capacity to prejudice the author’s reputation? 
In other words, would the public, upon seeing the end result, have a markedly negative perception of 
the author and his works? The answer is never clear as some treatments may not only simply have 
little or no effect on the public’s perception of the author, but may even enhance the author’s 
reputation. For example, substantial editing of a written work in which fundamental errors of fact or 
simply bad grammar are corrected, would possibly amount to a substantial treatment of the original 
work under section 80, but would arguably not prejudice the author’s reputation.  Where destruction 
of a work is concerned however, the consequence of such an act is unmistakable. The end result of an 
act of destruction is the same, no matter what the subject-matter involved is – the work is simply no 
more, and need not be subject to the same level of scrutiny by the courts.  
However, as already stated above, destruction leaves nothing behind which can affect the 
author’s reputation, and as such, there is a considerable body of academic and judicial opinion that 
destruction does not amount to a breach of the integrity right. 136 This is for example reflected in the 
following statement by Roeder, 
                                                                 
136 See n 9 above. Arguments against allowing objections to be raised against the destruction of works are 
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‘To deform [the creator’s] work is to present him to the public as the creator of a work not his 
own, and thus make him subject to criticism for a work he has not done; the destruction of the 
work does not have this result.’ 137 
Further, the House Report related to the enactment of the US Visual Artist’s Rights Act 
(VARA) in 1990 noted that 
‘Some Berne members do not include destruction of a work within the right of integrity 
because theoretically, once the work no longer exists, there can be no effect on an artist’s 
honor or reputation.’ 138 
In Carter v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., a US case in which the plaintiffs invoked VARA, the 
Second Circuit remarked that ‘...destruction is seen as less harmful than the continued display of 
deformed or mutilated works that misrepresent the artist.’139    
The idea behind the sentiments articulated above is that something else other than the author’s 
original work is represented as his, which is communicated or conveyed to the public and hence harms 
the public’s perception of him and his work. Similarly, harm to reputation in defamation occurs only 
when the libellous words are published. Until then, there is no harm. It should also be remembered at 
this juncture that additional requirements in section 80, subsections (3), (4) and (6) emphasise the 
requirement for public knowledge of the treatment meted out to the work. It makes the author ‘subject 
to criticism’ by the public according to Roeder above, in other words, subject to a negative evaluation 
by the public, which is, simply put, a slight on his reputation. The maltreated, mutilated or deformed 
work influences or works on the mind of the public and hence has an effect on the author’s reputation, 
and it is thought that continued display of the mutilated work causes more harm than simply 
destroying it entirely.  By contrast, evidently after destruction, there is nothing left that can be 
communicated or conveyed to the public, and therefore nothing that can affect what the public thinks 
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of the author. It can be seen that the focus is on the public’s perception, in other words, the effect on 
the author’s reputation. 
It is therefore manifest that what various commentators had in mind, when they opined that 
destruction leaves nothing behind which can harm the author, is reputation. As already mentioned 
above, in analysing cases involving the right of integrity, academic texts and judicial opinions 
emphasise the effect of the treatment of a work on the reputation of the author, and any academic or 
judicial attempts at defining the honour limb of section 80 simply echo definitions of the concept of 
reputation, instead of attempting to distinguish honour from reputation. Honour appears to have been 
left on the wayside to all intents and purposes.     
While reputation may not be affected by destruction, it is submitted that honour may be 
prejudiced by such an act.  Contumelia which has been defined as the act of treating the victim 
contemptuously, or without regard to his feelings or interests would similarly describe the situation 
here. The person who destroys a work of art has not taken into account the feelings of the work’s 
author, or if he has, he has simply dismissed them as unimportant before proceeding to destroy the 
work. The destroyer may have good reason to want to destroy the work. For instance, the Churchills 
famously had an intense dislike of Winston’s Churchill’s portrait painted by Graham Sutherland,140 
and had it destroyed. Although Sutherland was magnanimous in saying that he was not ‘unduly 
distressed’, as he might well be, he strongly denounced the act as ‘without question an act of 
vandalism’, strong terms indeed, thus revealing the true depths of his feelings about the matter.141 
Even if Sutherland himself was not really distressed, the very act of destroying the portrait was a 
display of the contempt the Churchills had for the portrait, and even Sutherland himself. Putting aside 
difficult and ambivalent issues regarding property ownership,142 the ethics of destroying artworks and 
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the potential loss of cultural heritage,143 it is at least clear that the effect such an act would have on the 
artist is profoundly upsetting, which is best described in the following statement by Roy Strong, 
director of the Victoria and Albert Museum, ‘...an artist tears something out of himself when he paints 
a portrait and to burn it is like burning a chunk of Sutherland.’144 This statement is not as incredible as 
it sounds, especially if we understand the author’s work to be ‘an embodiment of the author’s personal 
meaning and message’,145 or even something akin to an offspring of the author’s,146and therefore it 
would be obvious and natural to most that the destruction of the author’s work is obviously deeply 
offensive and wounding at worst, insensitive and tactless at best, redolent of the features of 
contumelia.  
Whilst Sutherland’s honour may have been acutely prejudiced by the destruction of the 
Churchill portrait, his reputation appears not to have been affected much by the incident, apart from 
some short term notoriety in the popular press.147 His standing, however, as an important artist, 
remained generally unsullied. A few years after the presentation of the portrait, Sutherland was 
awarded the Order of Merit,148 and even though his style of painting gradually became unfashionable 
in some quarters, his works have been regularly exhibited long after his death in 1980.149 When asked 
if the Churchill controversy would have the effect of clouding Sutherland’s memories, Sir Kenneth 
Clark, in an interview held in 1980, replied firmly in the negative.150 Even if destruction had been 
recognised at the time as a breach of the integrity right,151 Sutherland may have found it difficult to 
establish his claim as there was evidence that his reputation was not unduly affected by the 
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Countries’ (1994) 19 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 229, 250. 
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destruction, even though the requirement is that the treatment is prejudicial, not that it has prejudiced 
the reputation of the author. However, as we have seen above, destruction of an artwork is clearly an 
act which is insulting to the artist, and as such, prejudice to honour could have been a basis on which 
Sutherland could have made his claim.  
It is not to say that the reputation of an artist can never be affected by destruction of one or 
more of his artwork. In fact, it is abundantly evident that, despite the absence of something tangible 
which may affect public opinion, the destruction of an artist’s work can also affect his reputation 
profoundly. First of all, the destruction of an artwork would reduce the corpus of the artist’s life work, 
as well as possibly his financial standing, 152 hence giving the prima facie impression that the artist 
has a smaller repertoire than he has actually produced.153  According to Stamtoudi, 
In other words, the destruction of a work may diminish the professional image and standing 
of the author by eliminating one of his creations. Especially in cases where the reputation of 
an author depends on a limited number of creations, the destruction of even one of them may 
substantially affect his status.154  
Secondly, the knowledge that an artwork has been deliberately destroyed would surely at least 
raise questions in the public’s mind regarding the worth of the artwork, especially if the destruction 
had been carried out by a notable personage, particularly one who is a patron of the arts or with some 
substantial background in the arts. To the public, there must have been some reason that the work was 
not worth preserving. That said, even if it is true that an artist’s reputation can never be affected by the 
destruction of one of his artworks, which is disputed as argued above, the artist’s honour has surely 
been prejudiced at least.  
                                                                 
152 It should also be noted that destruction may well affect an artist’s finances in the long term as once his work 
is destroyed, he would no longer receive the potential royalties from resale of that work. Under the Artist’s 
Resale Right, an EU right introduced into the UK in 2006, an artist may receive a royalty each time his work is 
sold in the art market through a gallery, auction house or art dealer.  
153 Rajan (n 9) 46.  It was held in Seghal v The Union of India HC (Ind) FSR that by reducing the author’s body 
of work, his reputation will be prejudiced. The authors in Copinger and Skone James however do not believe 
that this line of reasoning will be followed in the UK, although they give no explanation as to why this should 
be so. See Garnett and others (n 53) pt II, para 11-47. 
154 Stamatoudi (n 9) 483. 
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By re-interpreting honour as a right to respect, UK moral rights law is in a position to give 
full countenance to not only the legal rights of artists, but more importantly to the respect which they 
seek and in most cases, of which they are deserving. It is not always the case that monetary rewards 
incentivise creative enterprise among writers and artists; respect is equally, if not more, important to 
such authors. Such a viewpoint has been expounded robustly in Kwall’s The Soul of Creativity. 155 
According to her work, by commodifying creative works and focusing solely on the economic 
incentives, the law has lost sight of what is truly important to the writers and artists in society. Ong, in 
his article,156 also expressed his concerns for the growing interest in emphasizing the economic 
efficiency and value maximization of moral rights.157 He questioned an innovative study by 
Hannsmann and Santilli, 158 which engaged in an economic analysis of moral rights, pointing out that 
their thesis assumed that the integrity right protected reputational interests, thus unduly elevating the 
pecuniary interests of the author, while marginalising the non-pecuniary ones.159 Re-interpreting 
honour in section 80 would assist in recognising the respect which should be accorded to UK’s 
authors, and also enable UK copyright law to focus beyond merely the economic rights of authors.  
In this respect, there is a further lesson to be learnt from the Romans. There is evidence that 
the Romans recognised the non-economic character of honour on the one hand, and conversely, the 
economic character of reputation on the other. According to Pound, three general forms of iniuria 
were recognised: real or physical injury, symbolic injuries such as affronts to honour, and pecuniary 
interests, which included injuries to reputation.160  Thus, a distinction was made between injuries such 
as affronts to honour and injuries such as damage to reputation, the latter being of an economic 
character. As already mentioned above, injury to a professional person’s reputation can result in harm 
to his financial standing, in that he not only stands to lose his current clients or customers, he may also 
                                                                 
155 Kwall (n 13). 
156 Burton Ong, ‘Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity Rights’ (2003) 26 
Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 297. 
157 ibid 312. 
158 Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli, ‘Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and 
Economic Analysis’ [The University of Chicago Press for The University of Chicago Law School] (1997) 26 
The Journal of Legal Studies 95. 
159 Ong (n 156) 307. 
160 Roscoe Pound, ‘Interests of Personality’ (1915) 28 Harvard Law Review 445 at 449-450. 
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lose potential clients or customers.161 The damage to one’s honour however cannot be as easily 
quantified in monetary terms, but is nevertheless just as palpable an injury which should not be 
ignored.  
8. Conclusion 
Honour is a very different creature from reputation. Interpreted as a right to respect, it need not 
require a public display of the act in question, and furthermore would encompass the entire 
destruction of works, which at the moment is not recognised as treatment which is prejudicial to 
honour or reputation under moral rights. While the victim’s feelings are relevant and important, the 
court need not base their judgment wholly on them, which is arguably undesirable as unreasonable 
claims by hypersensitive artists might be allowed. However, if the focus is trained on the act itself, in 
order to ascertain if it is objectively offensive, then this would ameliorate the risk of allowing 
unreasonable claims by hypersensitive artists. Where destruction is concerned, it has been argued 
above that, unlike mutilations or other modifications, the effect of destruction on a work is 
unambiguous, and the prima facie intent behind the act is, at least, disrespect or a complete disregard 
for the honour of the artist. The argument that destruction is at least prima facie insulting or 
contemptuous to the author, has been noted by William Patry, ‘One could argue however that 
destruction of a work shows the utmost contempt for the artist’s honour or reputation.’162 Despite the 
reference to both honour and reputation, Patry makes the point that destruction is clearly a 
contemptuous act. Hence, destruction constitutes a clear prejudice to the honour of the author, even if 
his reputation remains unaffected.    
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
161 Beverley-Smith (n 86) 11. 
162 WF Patry, Copyright Law and Practice (Bureau of National Affairs 1994) fn.128, 1044. 
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